Archive for December 18th, 2008
Our Prediction: Plummeting Donations to Universities
We have two other posts today, Oil in the 30s: Merry Christmas, in which we opportunistically crow about our prowess at predicting oil prices, and The Harvard-Yale-CALPERS Cycling Club, in which we lament the lack of imagination among fund managers and the enormous harm caused by inexperience or ineptitude (got to throw-in the personal and institutional greed, too). We do that via an analogy.
Now, this post extends both of those because, here, we make a prediction about the effects of the endowment losses suffered at many universities and colleges. News media reports indicate that many schools will face endowment losses proportional to those suffered by Harvard and Yale: 25 — 30%.
Controlling for the reduction in donations due to the recession and loss of wealth due to the substantial decrease in equity and real estate values, which admittedly isn’t easy, we forecast that donations will fall even farther, particularly among the non-wealthy, i.e., the middle-class.
In some sense, donations are a luxury good, and one would expect them to be highly sensitive to income levels, but that’s not our argument.
Our argument is much simpler: we imagine that lots of alumni, particularly the small donors, will say (at least to themselves): “We gave you our hard-earned money and you did what with it? Don’t you have some fiduciary responsibility to be relatively conservative to, at least, say, attempt to protect the principal? And you did what? I’m not giving you my money so you can dabble and “urinate” it away.”
Then again, maybe we’re just projecting – the psychological way – not the guess the future way.
The Harvard-Yale-CALPERS Cycling Club
My fickle friend, the summer wind.
A few weeks ago, Harvard announced that its endowment fund lost about $8,000,000,000 (since July 1).
This week, Yale announced that its endowment was down about 25% for the year. That’s about $5,900,000,000. (Their fiscal year started July 1.)
Likewise, according to yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, CALPERS, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, has lost about one-quarter of its assets since July 1. That’s almost $60,000,000,000. Poof! To put it into perspective; that is A LOT of money.
On their housing investment, CALPERS has been able to lose 103% of their investment due to levering it. Before the losses, they were levered about four-to-one; so, it is quite possible that they could continue to loss.1
Now, we’re not writing to directly criticize those fund-managers’ investment strategies. That’s rather mundane. We think indirect criticism via an analogy will suffice because it doesn’t require any financial training or knowledge nor the ability to calculate nor a host of other “skills” normally covered in MBA programs.
When we were younger and had fewer dependents we spent a substantial amount of time and energy cycling the narrow, twisting country roads that abruptly climb the steep hills and quickly descend into the the dark valleys and ravines that form much of Southwestern Pennsylvania.
We rode good distances in almost all conditions – as long as the temperature was above 5º Fahrenheit. Where we rode, it was normal to pedal for about 60% of the total distance. We’d guess that it equated to about 90% of the time because one was either pedaling uphill slowly or coasting downhill – usually quite rapidly.2 As a point of comparison, in the flat – except around turns – one pedals almost 100% of the time and distance.
One summer, we decided to take the road bike to the beach. The thought of riding on long, flat surfaces seemed particularly appealing given the omnipresent effects of gravity in our home terrain.
We recall our first ride on that vacation. Ah, to be on a flat, smooth surface where every rotation propelled one forward, rather than up. It was so liberating. We felt powerful and strong and rode for miles south along the Outer Banks. We were beginning to think that training in the hills had made us a formidable coastal plain rider. We were thrilled, and decided to turn around and race home to tell the chairman – though she wasn’t the chairman at that time, only the boss, and she didn’t really care.
And that’s when it hit us. As they sing, “The summer wind came blowing in from across the sea.” All that constancy, consistency, momentum, speed, and power. That feeling of invincibility, youth, and vigor. It was – we can’t resist – it was gone with the wind.
What had been an unnoticed tailwind was now a very obvious headwind. It would have been perfect if we were trying to fly a kite or a plane, and at the moment we understood completely why the Wright Brothers from Dayton, OH chose Kitty Hawk, NC to experiment with flight; wind, nice and strong, anytime you wanted it. We were reminded of it mile-after-lung-bursting, air-stiffening and resisting, lactic-acid producing mile.3
We had left the hotel a few hours earlier as young, fit, energetic, twenty-something, and returned wizened, shriveled, aged: like the only living survivor of the War between the States, which had ended 125 years earlier.
We learned something that day. We subsequently relearned the lesson repeatedly and ad nauseum as we rode through the windswept Midwest in both Missouri and later in the same Minnesota countryside where Greg Lemond trained to be a champion. (Don’t worry, we have no pretensions. In fact, we had and have no comprehension how men like Mr. Lemond can pedal as fast as they can for as long as they can. Our only conclusion is the self-comforting rationalization of mediocrity: if we can’t do it, they must be freaks!)
Over time easy money policies, foreigner investors with “excess” capital, low base rates, tightening credit spreads, and the associated low volatility all provide powerful momentum yet are almost imperceptible to the either (1) inexperienced – like we were those many years ago pedaling down NC 12 – or (2) the slow-witted. (You know, the folks that you joke about when you ask whether they have twenty years of experience or one year of experience twenty times.) Like us in our youth, both seem willing to extrapolate their performance from the slightest bit of evidence to items far outside their relevant and reliable ranges and draw far too optimistic conclusions about their own abilities.
Yes, everyone is a genius or a star when they’re running or riding with the wind.
It seems that much of peloton of traders, structurers, and fund managers, which grew larger and larger on that relatively flat surface between 2001 and 2007, had no appreciation for the fact that sometimes it is necessary to turn-around and sometimes even if you don’t turn, the winds can shift from your back to your front.4
Yes, folks. There may be wind, invisible and strong, that is assisting you, and that can change faster than you can say, “Where is Lehman trading today?”
It’s not necessary ride like Greg Lemond into the wind, and it is unrealistic to expect many to possess that ability to thrive is such conditions, but is it too much to ask fund managers to reach a level of knowledge and wisdom possessed by the likes of Bob Seger or Frank Sinatra or us?
We don’t think so, but despite what appears to be a deep-seated pessimism, we are eternally optimistic and hope. It’s why we are often disappointed and expect to be in the future.
The reader may think of many other ways to make a similar point, and their stories may be more lucid, direct, and parsimonious, but that just goes to show how truly inept some folks have been with other peoples’ money. “Who could have imagined?” Well, the answer is, when they’re getting paid as much as they were, they should have been able to do so. We wrote about that in The Seventy-Year-Old Teenager.
Footnotes:
- Based upon those numbers, it would seem that their leverage ratio is now negative, which is one of the silly things about such ratios. ↩
- Pedaling down most of the hills seemed to be nearly suicidal, and what didn’t kill you wouldn’t make you stronger. It would likely to pain along with a substantial probability of dismemberment. ↩
- Where was the coasting? It all had gone terribly wrong. ↩
- Think of leverage as putting a sail on your bike: not very useful in Western PA, quite a comfort when traveling downwind, and only a strength-sapping nuisance when the wind changes. ↩
Oil in the 30s: Merry Christmas
Back on May Day, when oil was about $120 per barrel, we speculated in Commodity Bubbles? Yeah, Probably, that the price could be $40 per barrel by year end. (We weren’t very specific about which kind of oil and when it was to be delivered, but such is life.)
We don’t keep track of all of our predictions – only the ones where we turned out to be right. For those, we continue our streak of being 100% correct, and we’ll continue to occasionally highlight them in posts.
On October 31, in Scary Thoughts on the Lack of Size and Humor, when oil was still a robust $65 per barrel, we revised our end-of-the-year estimate of $40 down to $25. With the current price of January-delivery oil contracts at $37 and with those contracts closing on Friday, we may have to forget making that prediction, but who knows? Crazier things have happened and can happen.
In that Halloween post, we also joked that through Congressional and executive efforts, Congressman and women were able to meet their campaign promises of lower energy costs. Through concerted, bi-partisan effort and quite a bit of senseless panic (TARP, TARP), they were able to do it even before the election.
We must ask: has any government in the history of the world ever presided over a larger and faster destruction of wealth? Note that there was not a single exogenous event that caused the massive destruction: no volcano, no tsunami, no earthquake, no invasion of body-snatchers, no forty days of rain and floods; no plague, no war, no comet or meteor collisions, no pestilence, no drought: only ineptitude and greed.
Yes, we do have cheaper oil and gas, but accompanying those declines is the destruction of trillions of dollars of equity and real estate values. In retrospect, some of that “value” was clearly fictional and over-stated, but it seems that the losses have gone deeper than to just wipe-away the market’s froth.1 In that regard, we can now fill the Suburban’s 44-gallon tank for about $75, but we’d prefer to have the stock market at December, 2007 levels or even the lower summer of 2008 levels.
We doubt that all of the negative effects of our endogenously-caused problems have been realized. In addition, we note that the (financial) implications of a global or national catastrophe is truly horrifying to contemplate. But we ask: does the reader think that the remaining financial firms are developing such scenario analyses and contingency plans or do you think that as Christmas approaches their managements – and risk managements, in particular – have breathed collective sighs of relief and gone back to business-as-usual (with a myopic focus on day-to-day market movements)?
Despite our pessimism, we do believe that this is the best time ever to be alive and the best country – the USA – in which to live.2 Thus, we do wish the reader a happy, prosperous, healthy, and blessed New Year.
Footnotes:
- We know we’re not being very precise and that such vague statements are fraught with the peril of sounding particularly stupid if taken out-of-context. ↩
- We think that we can make a convincing argument that cheap and readily-available toilet paper is a sufficient statistic for the wealth of evidence to support our viewpoint. ↩
Cassandra, the SEC and Mr. Madoff
We very much like the ancient Greek story of Cassandra, and one could well imagine that for almost ten years, Harry Markopolos felt like a modern-day Cassandra.
We don’t know enough about Mr. Markopolos to know whether he wrote letters to the SEC about hundreds of other fund managers claiming that they also ran Ponzi schemes or were part of the conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy, were adducted by UFOs, or provided FDR with advanced knowledge of the bombing of Pearl Harbor or some combination of the four. If so, then it is quite possible that Mr. Markopolos is a lucky crank, but we doubt it.
Instead, it seems that Mr. Markopolos is quite knowledgeable and was quite specific in his criticism of Bernard Madoff. Moreover, it seems that he was quite willing to stake his reputation and devote his time, energy, and consideration to doing the right thing – only to be ignored by an indifferent bureaucracy. Now that is a surprise, isn’t it.1
We sympathize with Mr. Markopolos. Since late September, we’ve written to a number of folks in the press and government about our proposed solution to the mortgage crisis only to receive no serious feedback. We did received one demeaning form e-mail message from our Congressman Jason Altmire.2
As The Wall Street Journal reports in Chasing Bernard Madoff, which appears on-line as Madoff Misled SEC in ’06, Got Off, it seems that Mr. Madoff may have avoided some scrutiny due to family and political connections.
Whether anyone acted overtly to stymie a serious investigation into Mr. Madoff’s practices in unclear. The much more common and insidious practice would be to dismiss the allegations with a knowing chuckle and possibly a wink and perhaps a few rhetorical questions: “Bernard Madoff? The former chairman of NASDAQ? Yeah, right.” Or possibly: “No, we investigated that complaint. We didn’t find anything. I don’t know what that guy’s problem is. What his name Markopolopogos or what? He doesn’t think we take our jobs seriously. Who is he to criticize us? That …off. He should get a life.”
We suspect the bureaucracy’s inertia was motivated in ways similar to those that we wrote about last month in Good Luck with that: Getting Bank Examiners to Act. We’d guess that if any SEC employees had an inkling of the truth, they – like Mr. Madoff – hoped that the problem could be solved with a nice bull market. (One of the most damning pieces of evidence against the SEC deals with the facts that to implement Mr. Madoff’s stated strategy, the sizes of certain equity options markets – stated in terms of the number of open positions – would have to be about five times larger than they were/are.)
Given that collective behavior, we think that Ronald A. Cass states it best in his WSJ opinion column, Madoff Exploited the Jews: “The violation of trust at the heart of that story … It illustrates the limits of law, not the need for more of it.”
- Of course, if that is a surprise to the reader, then we congratulate him for being able to avoid all contact with non-local government during his lifetime. ↩
- We’ll write about that experience in the near future because we think that we have discovered a more efficient and subversive alternative to term limits: limit Congressional staffs (we prefer “staphs”) to three people: one in the home district and two in Washington. How many windbags would attempt to spend their lives in the Senate or House if they had to prepare and work rather than talk, talk, talk? Given his level wit and infinite number of monkeys typing on keyboards, we suspect that our Senator Arlen Specter might be able to turn that into a funny Polish joke within a century or two. That’s our Arlen. He’s a crack-up. ↩
