Archive for November 3rd, 2008
The Understatement of the Year!
Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to Pass Real-World Test.
You Don’t Say! Our subtitle is the title of today’s Wall Street Journal front-page article about AIG (obviously).
As always we’ll point interested readers to our essay, Uncertainty Management, which emphasizes the broader notion of unmeasurable uncertainty over the narrower notion of (measurable) risk, and therefore permits really bad things to happen.
We mean bad things outside the scope of someone’s purely mathematical model, which, as an abstraction of reality, may ignore imaginable and unimaginable bad things. (We’re all for math – when it is thoughtfully and conscientiously applied. In fact, we think such application is one of the things that we do best.)
In that regard, we’ll once again note the subtitle of the above-referenced essay, Or How Trading is Like Playing in a Culvert on a Hot, Sunny, Summer Day. See dear reader, once one considers that one could drown from a flash flood – even on a presumably and locally Sunny day – the allure of such adventure dulls greatly – at least for the reasonable among us.
In other words, your mother may have been a scold, but there was probably a good reason for her to warn you about playing in culverts and drainage ditches (provided that she loved you, of course). She may not have discussed it in probabilistic terms, but that doesn’t mean she can’t recall reading about such drownings, say, forty years ago, or even before you were born.
Moreover, the fact that you didn’t read about any such cases in, say, the past ten years, doesn’t mean they don’t exist, and there, of course, lies the Problem of Induction, and the over-reliance on inferences from relatively short-duration, historical, data sets. (See our beautiful excerpt from St. James’ only Epistle on our Quotes page.)
The problem, dear reader, is that few senior managers (and almost no board members) understand the valuation and risk models used for securitizations, and many of the traders, consultants, and analysts who wield such tools often suffer from, what one may call, “framing” issues; we don’t mean that aspect of home construction despite its recent relevance.
We mean that if one’s only tool is a hammer, then lots of things look like nails. The metaphoric hammer may be an intangible Visual Basic or “C” programming algorithm, but the point remains the same; it’s just harder for senior management to see what one is pounding in their cubicle, office, or trading-floor seat.
To be sure, if anyone within most of the larger firms would have complained of the systematic risk – and how everything could go bad all at once – and the inapplicability of the standard models, which generally don’t permit such events, then that person most certainly would have been told that they don’t know what they’re talking about. Possibly, that they are unsophisticated or too negative.
Perhaps we just don’t pay enough attention to what happens in all of the large firms, but if the reader disagrees with our preceding paragraph, please note that there have been few recent success stories within major firms like the gains enjoyed by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, John Paulson, or Andrew Lahde–all independent fund managers. (If the new reader has read this far, then it is highly likely that they’ll like the link under Andrew Lahde’s name and his condemnation of many things in one fell swoop.) We know that our examples form a very small data set, but mostly what we’ve heard is how the more successful large firms haven’t lost as much as their brethren. We don’t recall any of them actually do well this year.
Also, we’ll probably have more to say about our boy, Taleb. We very much like his trading style, as it reminds us of the value of the Second Amendment and laws that permit concealed carry. See, dear reader, carrying a pistol is very much like buying deep-out-of-the-money puts. There’s a small, ongoing cost and a minor irritation, but when certain bad things happen, there is an option to exercise to protect ones self, and that value cannot be underestimated.
We haven’t said anything about CDS – the source of AIG’s problems – in this post but plan to do so shortly.
