Archive for October 11th, 2008
Eliminate Proprietary Trading at Insured Institutions
Today, October 11, we’ve been organizing our thoughts about the ongoing financial crisis. We’ll have more to say about ways to remedy the immediate crisis, but this post contains a specific recommendation for when the crisis ends, which today may seem to be far, far off. We’re sure that – whether justified or not – many laws and regulations will be revised and toughened, and this should be one of them.
We make this recommendation because from our experience and from the inferences that we’ve made about firms throughout this crisis, it seems that neither many senior managers nor regulators fully understand many prop trading activities although, of course, neither set of individuals would ever admit as much.
With government support comes obligations, including the commitment not to take outsized risks or ones that are particularly difficult to measure or approximate, and that seems reasonable to us.
In that regard, it seems very likely that the federal government will continue to provide higher levels of deposit insurance above the past limit of $100,000. Already that limit has been increased to $250,000, and there is talk of, at least temporarily, guaranteeing all deposits. (The guarantee of all deposits is stupid and counterproductive, and if it goes into effect, it will eliminate a useful disciplining and warning mechanism. Having large, uninsured depositors flee risky financial institutions warns managements to change and informs regulators of impending problems. We plan a separate post on that topic in the near future.)
Now, however, along with the indemnity that insurance provides should come the obligations of the insured – a quid pro quo if you will. It seems that the government has done a very poor job of setting risk-sharing mechanisms, i.e., the equivalent of deductibles, i.e., inflicting financial pain on the senior management when a bank fails – beyond the loss of share value.
We won’t comment on that aspect today; instead, we propose a limitation on insured-institution trading activities. Insured banks should not be permitted to have proprietary trading desks in their capital markets departments.
Note that this will not stop banks from harming themselves by (1) lending or (2) making bad investments or trades in their treasury departments or (3) mismanaging customer trading desks.
It will however, allow regulators to focus their attention on where the major risks are taken within the firms. Without going into details, we realize that their is a certain fungibility between treasury trades and prop trades in capital markets departments and to a certain degree between prop desks and customer desks in said departments, but it would seem to be more difficult to justify certain trades and strategies if the desks were within typical, bank-related business activities. (When could write much about this but it likely wouldn’t change minds; so, we defer.)
We’re completely for the free-market–more so than most bank managers – but until such institutions forsake their government insurance, we’ll insist that they have an obligation to the citizenry – through the government – to behave in a responsible, low risk manner. If that generates lower returns for them on average, then so be it. That’s the nature of the risk-return spectrum and their legal and fiduciary responsibilities.
By the way, if an all-in, full-accounting were ever performed, we’d be doubtful that such prop trading operations were profitable or value-creating, especially at the commercial banks. From what we’ve observed, trading PnL (profit and loss) is considered and sometimes trading-related PnL is considered for performance evaluation, but rarely an all-in accounting is performed. The marginal overhead costs risk-management, back-office operations, auditing, accounting, etc., associated with such activities are often ignored. Moreover, on a risk-adjusted basis, it is substantially less likely that overall, net returns are positive.
Finally, we actually think that many senior managers of commercial banks would welcome the ban. We suspect that many of them are suspicious of such activities but don’t feel qualified to evaluate and eliminate them. We think it is true of most regulators, too. They don’t object because they don’t want to seem unsophisticated; pride goeth before the fall.
Where Have All the Grownups Gone?
When will they ever learn?
Peggy Noonan has another excellent opinion column in today’s The Wall Street Journal. It is entitled, Playing Frisbee on a Precipice. The title and the column’s blurb say it all: “Our political class lacks the seriousness this moment demands.” Clearly, her essay is about the smallness of our present day politicians and their advisers.
She has perfected the ability to lament, yet simultaneously expect, the fallen nature of man.
We’ve written about our admiration for Ms. Noonan on a number of occasions, and once again she strikes the metaphorical nail directly on the head. There is an overwhelming smallness of the current political class where everything, regardless of the crisis, is attempted to be used for short-term political gain. What small, small people in both parties.
It’s obvious from her title that she uses the metaphor of playing Frisbee on a cliff to show their utter lack of seriousness, primarily within the two Presidential campaigns and with candidates. Perhaps deep down inside, our political actors realize that they are not up to the task and therefore continue to play games as the fellow citizens lose trillions of dollars.
In that sense our politicians are like young siblings or friends making outrageous claims against each other knowing full well that their parents would step-in and never permit such events to transpire. Unfortunately, the grownups are gone, and the noise downstairs isn’t an older sibling trying to scare via a the equivalent of a Halloween prank.
It’s worth mentioning that a month ago we used somewhat similar imagery to Ms. Noonan’s about the mortgage crisis in Our Poster Boy for the Credit Crisis.
In that post we compared many Wall Street firms to our hungriest Basenji, Boots. As the photo shows, Bootsy had his head buried so far in the food bag that he had no idea where he was. To his good fortune he was in the kitchen, and not near the basement steps as he pushed on.
Due to lax management, poorly designed incentives, and the resulting excessive risk-taking, Wall Street’s metaphoric head was buried just as far in the food bag seeking ever smaller and smaller morsels as it pushed closer and closer to the precipice of the Grand Canyon – located in to housing bust of the Southwest, no less.
We still prefer our graphic to the one in her column:

By the way, Ms. Noonan and Sarah Palin share that trait that seems to be feminine but which Ronald Reagan also possessed. It permits a severe scolding but in a gentle, humorous way.
We don’t know of Mrs. Palin well enough to include her, but we’d argue that it worked for Mr. Reagan and works for Ms. Noonan because their central core was/is so permanent, solid, and robust that one knows exactly their position before they speak. That inner sense of completeness, combined with the confidence that naturally follows from such maturity, means that listener or the reader knows the words are from the heart, the essence, the core and not just cheap rhetoric. That depth of conviction permits the humor and irony to be appreciated for what it is, and also what it is not: it is not meanness or cheap tactic.
Enough about people bigger than us. Out of our own smallness, we couldn’t help linking the failed leadership of the nation’s oldest babyboomers, who are now in charge of many government functions and large corporations, to one of their favorite, Pete Seeger protest songs from the sixties. It was about government missteps, too. “When will they ever learn? When will they ever learn?”
